1 HUB LAW OFFICES Ford Greene, Esquire 2 California State Bar No. 107601 711 Sir Francis Drake Boulevard San Anselmo, California 94960-1949 3 Telephone: (415) 258-0360 HOWARD HANSON 4 MARIN COUNTY CLERK Attorney for Defendant by P. Fan, Deputy GERALD ARMSTRONG 5 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARIN 9 10 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY No. 152 229 11 INTERNATIONAL, a California MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 12 not-for-profit religious AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF corporation; MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY 13 OR TRANSFER TO LOS ANGELES Plaintiffs, SUPERIOR COURT 14 VS. 15 GERALD ARMSTRONG; DOES 1 16 through 25, inclusive, March 20, 1992 Date: Defendants. Time: 9:00 a.m. 17 Dept: Four (4) Trial/Arbitration: None 18 19 20 21 22 23 25

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Statutes Code of Civil Procedure § 21 § 22 § 24 § 39 396b § 410.30 § 418.10 Civil Code § 1599 .

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Attorney for Defendant
GERALD ARMSTRONG

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

9 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARIN

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL, a California
not-for-profit religious
corporation;

Plaintiffs,

Plaintiffs,

OR TRANSFER TO LOS ANGELES
SUPERIOR COURT

VS.

GERALD ARMSTRONG; DOES 1

INTRODUCTION

When Gerald Armstrong executed the settlement agreement on December 6, 1986, a material provision was the forum selection clause set forth in Paragraph 20. The Hon. Paul G. Breckenridge, Jr., presided over the trial of Scientology's complaint against Armstrong in Church of Scientology of California v. Armstrong, Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. C 420 153 ("Armstrong I"), and was set to preside over the trial of Armstrong's Cross-Complaint against Scientology. Based upon his experience at trial as a defendant with Judge Breckenridge, Armstrong believed that Court

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was sufficiently intelligent, educated regarding the nature and practices of Scientology, and fair, to be able to manage what Armstrong was convinced would be post-settlement disputes regarding the scope and effect of the settlement agreement.

Declaration of Gerald Armstrong (Armstrong Decl.), Exhibit 2 at ¶¶
4, 5. Thus, the assurance of the protection of said Court ½/ which had treated him fairly was material to Mr. Armstrong's decision to settle. Id. at ¶. 5.

Scientology will claim that the Los Angeles Superior Court held that it does not have jurisdiction in this matter. This is not true. On December 23, 1991 Judge Geernaert made a narrow jurisdictional determination on the specific question whether without any type of evidentiary hearing he could enforce terms of the settlement agreement when that agreement had never been before the court, not to mention never having been incorporated into an order or judgment. 2/ He denied Scientology's motion that he do

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Since Judge Breckenridge has retired, Hon. Bruce R. Geernaert has been "presented with Judge Breckenridge's function" of presiding over post-settlement matters between Defendant Armstrong and Scientology. Exhibit 1-A at 10:24-25.

Judge Geernaert said that an evidentiary hearing was necessary because was there no order upon which he could act and because the "circumstances involved in entering into the agreement, the equitable concept of unclean hands, the public policy concerning any of the provisions sought to be enforced" required more from an "evidentiary standpoint." Exhibit 1-A at 11:13-18, 15:18-24. He criticized the agreement as "very broad and unclear . . . [and] to read the whole agreement, you come up with a wonderment as to what was mutual about it . . . you also wonder to what extent offering assistance . . . would be a term that any court would put in its order." Id. 12:19-28. Judge Geernaert said the agreement was "so unclear . . . so ambiguous . . . one-sided, . . . that it was entered into for the reasons he says were anything but voluntary" and thus merited a hearing. Id. at 22:3-23:5. He refused to act as Scientology's "rubber stamp," Id. at 17:6, and required a "judicial proceeding, not the one on the [video] tape." Id. at 13:9-10.

just that, making the common-sense determination that where there has been no order, there cannot be jurisdiction to enforce what is claimed to be a violation thereof.

The theory of this motion is that the settlement agreement contains a forum selection clause that was predicated upon Defendant Armstrong's valuation of, and his trust and belief in the fair judgment of, the trial judge Paul G. Breckenridge, Jr., upon which Defendant Armstrong relied in order to justify the risk of further abuse by Scientology that to Armstrong the settlement represented. Armstrong Decl. AT ¶ 6.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Before fully addressing Armstrong's theory, it is necessary to put his case into accurate past and present perspective.

One reason for this is to address, in advance,
misrepresentations of the record. For example, at page 19, lines
4-16 of its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction for Breach of
Contract, plaintiff has asserted that

. . . on December 3, 1991, the [Scientology Organization] filed a motion in Los Angeles Superior Court for Enforcement of the Settlement Agreement . . . the motion failed only because the Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction, since the case itself had already been settled. With a new action before the Court, an injunction should and must issue to preserve the [Scientology Organization's] rights pending trial.

This is an incomplete, if not incorrect, statement of the facts generated during the course of the December 23, 1991 hearing in Armstrong I before the Hon. Bruce R. Geernaert.

Judge Geernaert simply held that, at least without a

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hearing, $\frac{3}{4}$ he lacked the particular type of jurisdiction that Scientology asked him to assert: to enforce the draconian terms of settlement as though such terms had previously existed as an order of the court despite the fact that Scientology had never presented the agreement to the trial judge. Judge Geernaert found that at no time had there ever been a judgment or order incorporating the terms of settlement, and that there was no basis, e.g. no order, for him to enforce because the settlement agreement had never been presented to the court. See, Exhibit 1-A at 40:19-22, 41:17-20, 43:17-27, 45:12-16, 47:6-48:10, 49:5-7, 51:17-52:25, 53:5-11. $\frac{4}{4}$

Five years before Scientology's December 1991 effort to make Judge Geernaert enforce against Defendant ARMSTRONG the terms of an agreement that had never seen the inside of a courtroom, and after successfully defending Scientology's attack in Armstrong I for allegedly "stealing" documents belonging to L. Ron Hubbard, ARMSTRONG was poised to take to trial his Cross-Complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud and invasion of privacy on January 17, 1987. Armstrong Decl. at ¶ 4.

The facts to be proved at said trial had already been partially sketched by Judge Breckenridge when on June 22, 1984, he

³ Scientology attorney Michael L. Hertzberg argued that no hearing was required. Exhibit 1-A at 20:23-12.

Indeed, Judge Breckenridge twice noted that the parties file the settlement agreement. Exhibit 1-I, Minute Orders of 12/12/86 and 12/17/86. After ignoring those orders from Judge Breckenridge, Scientology asked Judge Geernaert to use the court's authority against ARMSTRONG, as though Judge Breckenridge had ordered ARMSTRONG to conform to the settlement agreement, when the essence and the terms of the settlement which had been withheld from the Court. Exhibit 1-C, Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Thursday, December 11, 1986.

filed his Memorandum of Intended Decision wherein he found:

After the within lawsuit was filed on August 2, 1982, Defendant Armstrong was the subject of harassment, including being followed and surveilled by individuals who admitted employment by Plaintiff; being assaulted by one of these individuals; being struck bodily by a car driven by one of these individuals; having two attempts made by said individuals apparently to involve Defendant Armstrong in a freeway automobile accident; having said individuals come onto Defendant Armstrong's property, spy in his windows, create disturbances, and upset his neighbors.

Appendix to Breckenridge Opinion at 14:22-15:3, Exhibit 1-B.

The disrespect, assault and abuse against ARMSTRONG as detailed by Judge Breckenridge was predicated upon Scientology's implementation of its notorious penchant for retribution, institutionalized as the infamous "Fair Game Policy." 5/

At the time of settlement ARMSTRONG was convinced that Judge Breckenridge knew and understood the nature of Scientology's

A corollary to the Fair Game Policy is Scientology's Policy Letter of 25 February 1966 entitled "Attacks of Scientology." Therein, the policy is laid out to "[s]pot who is attacking us" and to "[s]tart feeding lurid, blood, sex, crime actual evidence on the attacker to the press." Armstrong Decl. Exhibit 2-B. It is the implementation of Fair Game and Attack the Attacker that has spurred the allegations underlying Scientology's claims in the instant lawsuit. Armstrong Decl. at ¶ 6.

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Page 5. Points and authorities in support of defendant's motion to dismiss, stay, or transfer

The Second District has determined that ARMSTRONG was subjected to Scientology's Fair Game Policy "which permits a suppressive person to be tricked, sued or lied to or destroyed ... or deprived of property or injured by any means by any Scientologist . . . " Church of Scientology v. Armstrong (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1060, 1067, 283 Cal.Rptr. 917. See also, of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 872, 888-91, 260 Cal.Rptr. 331; Allard v. Church of Scientology (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 439, 443, n.1, 129 Cal.Rptr. 797; United States v. Kattar (1st Cir.1988) 840 F.2d 118, 125; Van Shaick v. Church of Scientology (U.S.D.C. Mass.1982) 535 F.Supp. 1125, 1131 n.4; Christoffersen v. Church of Scientology (1982) 57 Ore.App. 203, Church of Scientology v. Commissioner of 644 P.2d 577, 590-92; Internal Revenue (1984) 83 T.C. 381, 411-12, aff'd, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987). No one, not even judges, is beyond the scope of "Fair Game." Declaration of Ford Greene (Greene Decl.), Exhibit American Lawyer, 12/80, "Scientology's War Against the Judges."

"religious" practices, unlike many courts which are bombarded by the outrageous paper burden and science fiction claims built into Scientology litigation. Armstrong Decl. at ¶ 5. ARMSTRONG trusted Judge Breckenridge's judgment regarding the tactics and strategies of the Scientology Organization and felt relatively

comfortable in his hands. Id. at ¶ 10.

Thus, as one of the legitimate objects of settlement (and one of two in Armstrong's favor), ⁶/ the settlement agreement provisions provided a forum selection clause in the event any litigation regarding the settlement was generated in the future.

On December 11, 1986, Armstrong's attorney, Michael J. Flynn and Scientology attorneys John G. Peterson, Michael Lee Hertzberg and Lawrence E. Heller appeared, ex parte, before Judge Breckenridge and announced that they had settled Cross-Complainant Armstrong's Cross-Complaint in Armstrong I. Exhibit 1-C, Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Thursday, December 11, 1986. At that time said attorneys submitted a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal, Exhibit 1-D; an Order Dismissing Action With Prejudice, Exhibit 1-E; a Stipulation for Return of Sealed Materials and Exhibits, Exhibit 1-F; Order for Return of Exhibits and Sealed Documents, 1-G; and a Stipulated Sealing

As ARMSTRONG will argue in his opposition to injunctive relief, the provisions Scientology seeks to enforce against him are severable from the contract as void and unenforceable violations of public policy. Civil Code § 1599. Not the entire object of the contract, however, is necessarily illegitimate. It is ARMSTRONG's position that should any part of the agreement survive its pervasive illegality, the dismissal of his crosscomplaint at the threshold of trial in Armstrong I was supported by the promise set forth in the forum selection clause that all further proceedings, if any, would be held before the judge who had treated him fairly.

Order, Exhibit 1-H. The filing of said documents was spelled out in the Court's minute order dated December 11, 1986. Exhibit 1-I.

On December 12, 1986, Judge Breckenridge through his clerk, noted that the settlement agreement referred to in the Joint Stipulation of Dismissal and Order Dismissing Action had not been filed. Exhibit 1-J. The settlement agreement never was filed with the Los Angeles Court because according to Scientology's attorney, it was "irrelevant." Exhibit 1-A at 28:24-26.

Notwithstanding the fact that Scientology had failed comply with the Order Dismissing Action it provided to Judge Breckenridge and file the agreement, it brought a motion to enforce that agreement. Exhibit 1-K. Armstrong opposed that motion, Exhibit 1-L, and Scientology replied. Exhibit 1-M. After Armstrong filed a supplemental memorandum on the issue of jurisdiction, Exhibit 1-N, Scientology filed its additional reply. Exhibit 1-O.

ARGUMENT

I. PARAGRAPH 20 IS A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE
WHEREBY THE PARTIES CONTRACTED THAT LOS ANGELES
SUPERIOR COURT WOULD BE THE FORUM FOR ALL ACTIONS
AND PROCEEDINGS WHICH AROSE FROM THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.

Paragraph 20 of the settlement agreement states in full:

Notwithstanding the dismissal of the lawsuit pursuant to Paragraph 4 of this Agreement, the parties hereto agree that the Los Angeles Superior Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this Agreement. This Agreement may be enforced by any legal or equitable remedy, including but not limited to injunctive relief or declaratory judgment where appropriate. In the event that any party to this Agreement institutes any action to preserve, to protect or to enforce any right or benefit created hereunder, the prevailing party in any such action shall be entitled to the costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees.

Exhibit 2-C.

The Code of Civil Procedure states that the two existing

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classes of judicial remedies are "actions" and "special proceedings." C.C.P. § 21. An "action" can be civil or criminal, C.C.P. § 24, and is "an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the declaration, enforcement, or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense.

C.C.P. § 22. Thus, based upon the express terms of Paragraph 20 in conjunction with the foregoing definitions, it is clear that said paragraph is a forum selection clause.

Although historically not favored by American courts, M/S

Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (1972) 407 U.S. 1, 9, 32 L.Ed.2d

513, it is settled that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court and absent some "compelling and countervailing reason it should be honored by the parties and enforced by the courts." Id. 407 U.S. at 11. Thus, for almost 20 years California has upheld the validity of such clauses.

. . . we are in accord with the modern trend which favors enforceability of such forum selection clauses. [Citations.] . . . we conclude that forum selection clauses are valid and may be given effect, in the court's discretion and in the absence of a showing that enforcement of such a clause would be unreasonable.

Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles

County (1976) 17 Cal.3d 491, 495-96, 131 Cal.Rptr. 374; Lifeco

Services Corp. v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 331, 334
35, 271 Cal.Rptr. 385.

Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 entitles a defendant on or before the last day of his time to plead to serve and file a motion to dismiss or stay the action on the ground of inconvenient

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HUB LAW OFFICES Ford Greene, Esquire '11 Sir Francis Drake Blvd. San Anselmo, CA 94960 (415) 258-0360 forum. An inconvenient forum holding may be obtained when the court finds it in the interest of substantial justice to do so.

C.C.P. § 410.30. A contractual forum selection claim requires a court to decline jurisdiction "on the ground that the plaintiff has unfairly or unreasonably invoked the jurisdiction of an inconvenient forum." Furda v. Superior Court (Serological Biopsy) (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 418, 424-25, 207 Cal.Rptr. 646.

As a further legal basis for Defendant Armstrong's motion, Code of Civil Procedure section 396b (a) provides that at on or before the time to respond to a Complaint, the Defendant may file a noticed motion to transfer the action or proceeding to the proper court. Upon hearing the motion, the court shall, if it appears that the action or proceeding was not commenced in the proper court, order the action transferred to the proper court.

Id.

The instant case is not in the proper court. Rather than abide by the forum selection clause of the very agreement that Scientology asks the Court to enforce against Defendant Armstrong, Scientology disregards provisions of the agreement when to do so suits its forum shopping purposes, and after it has accomplished an end-run around the Los Angeles Superior Court, the Court which best knows the case, it seeks to enforce other provisions of the agreement in a jurisdiction which knows virtually nothing of the long history of antecedent litigation. Based upon such expedient conduct, Scientology should be estopped from asserting any position contrary that which the forum selection clause requires. Scientology is afraid of the Court which knows it best. Instead, it has come to Marin County to seek relief it may have a lesser

chance of obtaining in Los Angeles. In Marin County, Scientology also accomplished the goal of escaping from the potential further review of the appellate court that is familiar with the appeal of Armstrong I. Church of Scientology v. Armstrong, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 1060.

In order to be able to fully understand the gravity of the arguments in this case why certain contractual provisions should be severed and declared unenforceable as violative of public policy, it is necessary for the full available record of Armstrong I to be available to the Court in order for the Court to be able to review what Scientology is trying to suppress. That file is in Los Angeles, not in Marin County. That is why Scientology has disregarded the forum selection clause and brought the instant action in this Court.

II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Pursuant to Evidence Code section 451, Defendant Armstrong requests this Court to take judicial notice of the court's file in Church of Scientology of California v. Gerald Armstrong, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. C 420 153. Copies of documents in that case are submitted herewith as Exhibits 1-A through 1-O. See Declaration of Ford Greene, Exhibit 1-A through 1-O.

III. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND ITS ATTORNEYS FOR RESISTING THE INSTANT MOTION.

Code of Civil procedure section 396b (b) provides the Court with authority to award reasonable expenses and attorney's fees in making the motion to transfer. In determining whether or not to make such an order, the Court must take into consideration (1) whether an offer to stipulate to change of venue was reasonably

made and rejected, and (2) whether the motion for transfer, or selection of venue, was made in good faith given the facts and law the party making the motion or selecting the venue knew or should have known. Ibid.

In this case, Armstrong's counsel made an offer, in writing, to stipulate to the transfer of the action to Los Angels Superior Exhibit 1-Q. No response has been received to said offer. CONCLUSION

Since Scientology is in Marin County seeking to enforce an agreement which, by the express terms of Paragraph 20 thereof, requires such an enforcement effort to be prosecuted in the Superior Court of Los Angeles, this Court should either dismiss the action outright, stay the same, or transfer it to Los Angeles Superior Court.

March 5, 1992 DATED:

HUB LAW OFFICES

GREENE

Attorney for Defendant

GERALD ARMSTRONG